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Pelosi: Davis Report on Katrina Leaves Unfinished Business

February 15, 2006

Pelosi: Davis Report on Katrina Leaves Unfinished Business

Wednesday, February 15, 2006

Contact: Brendan Daly/Jennifer Crider, 202-226-7616

Washington, D.C. â€" House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi released the following fact sheet today highlighting some of the key questions that were not addressed by the Davis Committee report on Hurricane Katrina, which was issued today:

The Davis Committee failed to fully examine many critical issues about the federal response to Hurricane Katrina. The White House and other agencies refused to provide essential documents to the Committee, and the Committee never insisted on full compliance with its document requests.

As a result, the report rarely assesses how these problems occurred, why they were not corrected sooner, and who in particular was responsible. Instead, the report describes generic â€Å"institutional” failures, general â€Å"communications problems,” and vague â€Å"bureaucratic inertia.”

Some of the key questions the Davis Committee did not fully answer include the following:

How did White House officials, including Chief of Staff Andrew Card, respond to dozens of urgent warnings and requests for assistance from former FEMA Director Michael Brown?

Despite the President’s promise on September 15, 2005, to cooperate with Congress, President Bush allowed the Davis Committee to talk to only a single White House official â€" Ken Rapuano, the Deputy Homeland Security Advisor. Mr. Rapuano refused to discuss what information other White House officials were receiving, or how those other officials responded to requests for help. And the White House refused to provide e-mails and other communications that are critical to understanding the failures in the federal response.

Why were top White House officials missing in action or unaware of key facts in the crucial days before and after the hurricane hit?

On the day Katrina struck, President Bush was on vacation in Crawford, Texas, Vice President Cheney was fly-fishing at his ranch in Wyoming, Chief of Staff Andrew Card was vacationing at his lakefront summer home in Maine, and Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend was also on vacation in Maine. Why did they leave a relatively junior official in charge of the White House Situation Room for one of the top three potential disasters facing the nation?

Why did President Bush and other top Administration officials insist on asserting that the levees held until the day after the hurricane struck when in fact they failed almost immediately?

President Bush said â€Å"the levees broke on Tuesday in New Orleans.” Secretary Chertoff, General Myers, and other officials made similar claims weeks after the storm. Were these statements based on a complete lack of situational awareness, or were they part of a campaign to justify the slow federal response?

How did Secretary Chertoff, Secretary Rumsfeld, and Secretary Leavitt personally respond during Hurricane Katrina?

The Davis Committee requested e-mails and other communications involving the three Secretaries, but received virtually none of these communications. In fact, the Davis Committee was never able to obtain even a log from the agencies of the documents that were withheld. Without examining the communications of the department heads, the Davis Committee was not able to determine the full extent of their roles in the failed federal response.

Why did Secretary Chertoff wait until the day after Katrina struck to initiate the National Response Plan?

Although the â€Å"Hurricane Pam” exercise in 2004 warned that state and local governments would be overwhelmed by such a â€Å"mega-disaster,” Secretary Chertoff waited until Tuesday, August 30, to invoke the National Response Plan, designate Katrina an â€Å"incident of national significance,” appoint a â€Å"principal federal official,” and gather the Interagency Incident Management Group to respond to the disaster.

What role did Secretary Chertoff play in the â€Å"emaciation of FEMA”?

Michael Brown testified that FEMA’s budget had been cut repeatedly as the new Department of Homeland Security shifted its focus away from â€Å"all hazards” preparedness and toward terrorism. Yet Secretary Chertoff refused to provide key documents requested by the Davis Committee to explain his role in these budget decisions.

Why did Secretary Chertoff allow the operational supplement to the National Response Plan to languish for more than seven months?

When the National Response Plan was issued in January 2005, it said a Catastrophic Incident Supplement would be completed to guide specific agency responses to various disasters. Yet it wasn’t completed until September 6 â€" seven days after Katrina struck.

Why did the Defense Department reject urgent FEMA mission assignments?

Two FEMA officials told the Davis Committee their requests for military assistance were rejected. Yet Secretary Rumsfeld defied the committee’s sole subpoena and refused to turn over his internal communications that may have shed light on these decisions.

Who’s in charge of the National Disaster Medical System?

The Davis Committee interviewed Stewart Simonson, the Assistant Secretary of Public Health and Emergency Preparedness at HHS, and Jack Beall, the Chief of the NDMS Section of FEMA. Both claimed the other was in charge of the nation’s medical response system for disasters. The Davis Committee didn’t figure out who is right.